



Translated by Ruth McVey
. . . Je ne me suis pas reporte aux documents
originaux. Si j!avals seulement entr’ouvert la 
bibliotheque Dreyfusarde, ma confession aurait 
pris 1T air ou la pretention dTune histoire. . . .
Elle aurait perdu lTentiere spontaneite qui fait 
probablement son merite.
Leon Blum, preface de "Souvenirs sur 1T affaire1
It must have been 19 29. I was a student and chairman of 
the Amsterdamsahe Sociaal Democratisohe Studenten Club , when the 
post brought me a letter from a young Indonesian who had just 
arrived in Amsterdam and wanted information about socialism and 
the socialist movement.1 Right away I was interested. Both in 
the Socialist party--the SDAP--and in the Social Democratic 
Student Club connected with it, the colonial question was at 
that moment the center of attention. We had,however, had little 
contact with the Indonesians then living in the Netherlands, who 
in general kept carefully away from Dutch political groups. I 
thought of the propaganda advantage that we could gain from con­
tact with a real Indonesian--especially if he would speak on 
behalf of our movement. I therefore jumped on my bike and 
looked him up.
He was staying in South Amsterdam, in what was then a pros­
perous middle-class neighborhood, where, so he told me, his 
sister had rented a flat. As with so many Indonesian families 
transplanted to Europe, SjahrirTs sister's household had trouble 
in the beginning trying to fill the new and unaccustomed dwell- 
ingspace in a rational manner. That was perhaps the reason why 
my visit occasioned a small panic, which manifested itself in
1. Sjahrir arrived in the Netherlands in 1929, enrolling first 
at the University of Amsterdam and later becoming a law stu­
dent at Leiden. The Amsterdam Social Democratic Student Club 
united local student sympathizers of the Netherlands Social 
Democratic WorkerTs Party (SDAP). There was considerable 
tension between the party's cautious leadership and the more 
radical elements within it, resulting in the periodic forma­
tion of leftist caucuses and breakaway groups. The author
belonged at the time to this more radical element, as did 
many of the student adherents of the SDAP. (Tr.)
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much giggling and slamming of doors. Evidently I was the first 
contact between their house and the cold outside world. In the 
end, I was directed to a room which Sjahrir identified as his 
own but which seemed to me intended for multiple use. He made 
the statement, to be sure, with a smile that had more self- 
deprecation than embarrassment in it. It was that ability to 
laugh at himself, the debunking of his own person, which imme­
diately made me feel close to him.
I saw a young man, small, slender, and well proportioned.
But what struck me most was his face: its features were regular
and, above all, full of character. It was a beautiful face, one 
which buoyed and touched me at the same time. He laughed a good 
deal, but it was not the laugh of so many Indonesians, an expres­
sion of shyness, a barrier against the need to reply. Sjahrir 
was open, direct; and his idealism was so enthusiastic and 
honest that it was impossible not to like him at first sight.
Half sitting, half lying on the sofa-bed, he began a con­
versation in which he was the one to ask questions and I the 
one to explicate. In my discourse, I stressed the line which I 
myself preferred--that of the left wing, which supported the 
Indonesian nationalists on the colonial question--while I hinted 
over and again that the best way of learning about socialism 
was to become a member of our student club.
After that visit, I came there often, and I soon understood 
why it was his sister who had rented the flat. I was confronted 
in real life with what I had till then only known from books: 
the tradition of the Minangkabau matriarchate, which places 
property rights in the hands of the female line. Sjahrirfs 
sister, as small and beautiful as he--but in whose face her 
character had drawn a harsher line--ruled not only.over her 
husband, a gifted physician, but over everyone in the extended 
family who came within her reach. And, at times, I was to see 
a frown crease SjahrirTs forehead, whenever that sisterly regime 
became too much for him.
I believe that Sjahrir did in fact become a member of our 
club but then only for a very short time. That is unimportant, 
anyway. We were already friends from that very first morning. 
Later Sjahrir told me that I had won him not through my explica­
tion (of which I had been not a little bit proud), not through 
the fire with which I--from conviction and the desire to win a 
convert--had embraced the nationalist cause, but through the 
fact that immediately on receiving his letter I had leaped on 
my bike to snare him. It had impressed him greatly with the 
activism of the student club. That impression was exaggerated, 
but then what other use has propaganda?
Personal contact between Netherlanders and Indonesians in 
Europe was not difficult, especially if politics was avoided.
The racism that was characteristic of colonial relations in the
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Netherlands Indies and which was an unavoidable consequence of 
the power relationship there--for a tiny minority had to keep 
an overwhelming majority under its thumb--found little echo in 
the Netherlands itself. The Indonesians with whom the Dutch 
came in contact in Holland did not belong to an economically 
backward or culturally disadvantaged part of society; on the 
contrary, they were sons of well-off bourgeoisie or noble offi­
cials. They thus possessed a level of refinement that was con­
siderably higher than that of the masses and for that matter 
than a good part of the Dutch middle class. Thus the almost 
unavoidable condescension with which we tend to approach members 
of a disinherited group, however good our intentions, had no 
chance to develop. The Indonesians who came to the Netherlands 
as students were treated as complete equals. While in the 
Netherlands Indies, they were often subjected to petty persecu­
tions by the colonial authorities, but in Holland they could 
defend themselves with the same weapons as their opponents.
They took full advantage of Dutch freedoms and democratic 
rights, and in the Netherlands they could publish pamphlets and 
articles that would undoubtedly have landed them in a colonial 
prison. Hatta, an Indonesian student who came to Holland before 
Sjahrir, won international renown for being tried by the Dutch 
government for his publications--but the government lost the 
case.2
The West appeared to the Indonesian students in the Nether­
lands in an entirely different light, and the contrast with the 
brutish racism of the colony inevitably made a deep impression 
on those young and emotionally still very malleable people.
This was not only true for Sjahrir, it was especially import­
ant for the formation of his particular character. In the same 
way, much is explained by the fact that until the war Sukarno 
had never been outside the Netherlands Indies, and thus missed 
his youth.
It is not true that Sjahrir was conquered by the West. It 
was different for him: he flowered in the climate of the West;
his temperament came to its natural maturation there. I never 
found in him anything which resembled the stereotype of the 
’’Oriental mentality.” He was direct, hated circumlocution, and 
stood uninhibitedly open to the ideas of others. He wanted to
2. Mohammad Hatta, the later Indonesian vice president, came to 
the Netherlands in 1922. He initially studied at the Uni­
versity of Leiden, but later switched to the commercial school 
at Rotterdam. In 1925 he became treasurer of the Perhimpunan 
Indonesia (see note 7 below), and in 1926 he became its 
chairman. Because of the Pi’s leftist activity and interna­
tional connections, the government raided the rooms of its 
leaders in June 1927; in September, a number of its members, 
including Hatta, were arrested. He was released for lack of 
evidence of revolutionary conspiracy in March 1928. (Tr.)
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learn as much as possible, to get to know as much as possible 
of science and of life, and he threw himself with equal enthusi­
asm into study and into discussions and ramblings through 
Amsterdam. His systematic course work soon petered out, and 
was replaced by a less orderly if ubiquitous search for knowl­
edge concerning all the problems that then engaged us. And 
what did not engage us?
Above all, we debated with each other about the colonial 
question. The problem was real, it was dramatic, it fired our 
romantic senses and our love of a fight. We--that is to say 
the students of the left wing, who had gained a certain dominance 
in Amsterdam thanks to the efforts of their chairman. We were 
naturally supported by those Indonesians whom we could rope into 
our discussions, for we were both agreed that the Netherlands 
Indies had to be free, as soon as possible, right away. I re­
member the chants we used to raise at party meetings: Indonesia
free from Holland Now!--sometimes more to bait the older leaders 
of the SDAP than to please Sjahrir and his friends.3
What should come after liberation we could only vaguely 
imagine, for the power exercised by the colonial regime made 
such a formidable impression on us that the struggle against it 
absorbed all our thoughts. But the question of Indonesia^ 
future social arrangements was raised by others in the movement, 
and first of all by the colonial experts of the right wing of 
the Social Democratic party. These experts, who were honest 
democrats but also former Indies colonial officials, opposed 
all revolutions, and certainly one in the Netherlands Indies, 
where they themselves had so peacefully worked. But they dis­
guised this rejection by accusing the nationalist leaders of 
wanting to replace Dutch imperialism by Indonesian capitalism.
As usually is the case when people are quarreling over something 
in the distant future, the formulation of the problem by both 
sides turned out, in the light of history, to have been false.
The question was not whether Indonesia, once it became independ­
ent, would become socialist or capitalist, but whether or not 
it would become a chaos. Naturally, though, we could not know 
that in 1930.
The standard of living of the Indonesian masses was then so 
low that the nationalists naturally came to justify their desire 
for independence--which was an expression of their growing self- 
confidence--by pointing to colonial exploitation, thus making a 
social grievance out of a spiritual desire. The dramatic and
3. The official slogan of the SDAP--the Indies free from Holland 
--did not include the "now" that the radicals and the Indone­
sians considered essential, for the party leadership argued 
at the time that Indonesian society would be prepared for 
independence only after a relatively lengthy period of tute­
lage. (Tr.)
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tragic situation of the colonized country drove the young 
nationalists to the left wing, the cautious attitude of the right 
wing socialists only increasing their impatience. In the joint 
discussions which we held as Dutch and Indonesian students, the 
mood was-leftist; for the group to which I had belonged had 
chosen for Marxism and against the reformists. Against the 
vague, sentimental, ethical views which were then current in 
Dutch social democracy in the guise of "religious socialism," 
we placed the clear, courageous, virile--and naturally scien­
tific !--teaching of historical, dialectical materialism. Viewed 
from the present, it was a bit of Friedrich Engels dressed up 
as Cyrano de Bergerac--what a fine time we had!
There was a great deal of talk among us about socialism, 
but very few took the trouble really to study it. Sjahrir be­
longed to the few. He set out to study the theory of socialism 
--among others the books of Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg on 
imperialism--and submerged himself in the polemics which then 
absorbed the socialist movement and in which Karl Kautsky, Otto 
Bauer, and later Hendrik de Man were prominent. Sjahrir was 
never able completely to free himself later from that rational­
ist, more or less Marxist camp, in spite of his broad field of 
interest--or perhaps just because of it. For politics and thus 
political science was never his great love, and, therefore, he 
never found the energy to subject his ideas in this field to a 
deepgoing revision; but more about that later.
In the youthful enthusiasm of our student days we wanted 
to embrace all humanity, above all the common people, or at 
least the workers. Sjahrir therefore took a spiritual plunge 
into the proletariat. He cherished, like so many intellectuals, 
the idea that the true nature of life and socialism could only be 
found in the working class and that understanding of the workers 
and solidarity with them could only be gained by sharing their 
life. I had no need of such an experiment myself: I came from
the family of a worker who, by enormous effort, had struggled 
upwards to the level of a petty bourgeois, at the same time 
becoming leader of a trade union. Sjahrir had no feeling for 
my viewpoint, however. His relationship to socialism was still 
in the phase of first love, and any hesitation at sharing his 
pure pilgrimage appeared to him a betrayal of his beloved. It 
was not the last time that he defined a difference of opinion 
as an ideological sin, and I believe that it came from the fact 
that he interpreted contrary behavior as disobedience. That is 
often the case with people of strong character; and Sjahrirfs 
character was strong. This gave him an early dominance over 
his Indonesian fellow-students, who anyway took life a great 
deal more easily than he. That domination strengthened Sjahrirfs 
paternalistic inclinations, which gave me, too, trouble at times. I
I lost track of Sjahrir for some time. Later I gathered 
from his stories that he, in search of radical comradeship, had 
wandered further and further left, coming to rest at last with
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a handful of anarchists who had managed to keep themselves free 
of all capitalist taint by avoiding any profitable work, and 
who survived by sharing everything with each other except for 
toothbrushes (insofar as there were any) but including contra­
ceptives. He re-emerged from this rather quickly and without 
damage, and afterwards his interest in socialism took more prac­
tical forms.
In order to acquaint himself with the life of the labor 
movement, he went to work for the secretariat of the Interna­
tional Transport Workers’ Federation, which then played an im­
portant international role.1* It was under the leadership of a 
left socialist, Edo Fimmen, a Danton-figure with a Beethovenesque 
visage and hairstyle but with the gentle temper of a Salvation 
Army recruit. (Fimmen had in fact belonged to the Salvation 
Army in his youth, and he remained a part of it at heart his 
whole life long.) Here Sjahrir found congenial surroundings.
I don’t know what he learned there; an international secretariat 
is no real labor union and has neither the daily routine nor the 
problems of one. The Federation held to a radical !fMarxistn 
course at that time, and Fimmen could only strengthen him in 
his proletarianist notions. But I should add that FimmenTs 
right-hand man, Jaap Oldenbroek— who was later to become the 
secretary of the International Congress of Free Trade Unions-- 
already demonstrated a strong dose of realism at that time, 
which contrasted strongly with Fimmen’s romanticism. In any 
case, in that period Sjahrir got to know the socialist movement 
of Europe not only as a struggle movement but also as an organi­
zational system geared to bring about practical results. This 
sort of constructive experience was lacking in nearly all the 
Indonesian students, who had at best read about organizations. 
None had lived in one like Sjahrir, even if only for a short 
time, so that he knew what they were about.
Meanwhile, an atmosphere of crisis developed in the Nether­
lands itself. The world economic crisis of 1929 had ripped the 
self-satisfied calm of Holland to tatters, and a giant army of 
the unemployed broke the power of the labor movement. The 
prices of the Netherlands Indies1 tropical exports plunged on 
the world market, disrupting colonial society and government 
finance. An ultra-reactionary governor general came to office 
in the Indies, and the pressure of the authorities on the na­
tional movement became heavier than ever before.4 5 All relation­
4. The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) main­
tained a position somewhere between the reformist socialist 
parties and the Communists, and during the 1920’s it formed 
one of the few points where international cooperation between 
the two movements was sometimes possible. (Tr.)
5. The moderate Governor General de Graeff was replaced by the
conservative De Jonge in 1931. (Tr.)
ships became more charged. The nationalist students in Holland, 
who had their own organization, the Pevhimipunan Indonesia, with­
drew more and more into themselves.6 Through Sjahrir, I had 
gotten to know one of the PI leaders, Hatta, surely the hardest 
working of all the Indonesian students, who had gained fame as 
a result of his trial by the Dutch government and who had also 
acquired respect in the Netherlands by his great--sometimes too 
great--seriousness. My friendship with Sjahrir and Hatta meant 
that I did not lose contact with the Indonesians, but by now 
there were two distinct worlds--the Dutch socialist movement 
with its left wing, and the Leiden milieu of the PI. There were 
other ties between the two worlds besides my acquaintance: Fimmen 
and Hatta, for example, knew each other because both had taken 
part in a congress of the League Against Imperialism and Colonial 
Oppression together with many other nationalist leaders who were 
later to make a name for themselves, such as Nehru from India 
and Senghor of Senegal.7
The Communists began to build cells in the League, and they 
also did so in the Perhimpunan Indonesia. The construction of 
cells took place in the usual sneaky manner and was thus most 
successful. A radical wind blew through Leiden, sweeping with 
it especially those who knew socialism only from coffeehouse 
talk. Eventually, the Communists managed to get the upper hand 
in the Perhimpunan Indonesia, their first deed then being to 
throw out everybody who disputed their influence.8 This brings
6. The organization was founded as the Indische Vereeniging in 
1908; it committed itself to nationalism and changed its name 
to Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association) in 1923.
By 1925-26 it had entered into relations with the Dutch and 
Indonesian Communists and with the Comintern, though it re­
mained radical nationalist rather than Communist in character. 
Officially, it was open to all Indonesians resident in the 
Netherlands, but in practice it was devoted to the student 
population. (Tr.)
7. The League Against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression (LIGA) 
was founded in 1927, largely as a result of the efforts of 
the German Communist Willy Munzenberg. Its first congress 
was held that year in Brussels; Hatta led the Perhimpunan In­
donesia delegation and was made a member of the congress 
presidium. In 1929 he took the Perhimpunan Indonesia out of 
the LIGA, arguing that it had become too exclusively Communist. 
(Tr.)
8. Hatta was replaced as PI chairman in 1929; his immediate suc­
cessors were figureheads, real power lying with the executive 
member Rustam Effendi, who was secretly (later publicly) a 
member of the Communist Party of Holland. Contact between 
the SDAP and the PI became minimal at this time, among other 
reasons because the SDAP decided not to send representatives
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me to the memory which is etched most clearly in my mind.
One day in 1931, I read in the paper that the Perhimpunan 
Indonesia had expelled two members, Hatta and Sjahrir.9 It was 
a report pf only a few printed lines, but the importance of it 
struck me at once. The PI was significant not because of its 
size but because it could express things that were suppressed 
in the Indies and so had become the unofficial spokesman for the 
Indonesian nationalist movement. Hatta, who had become the most 
authpritative —  or rather the only authoritative--figure among 
the students in the Netherlands, had as a result acquired sta­
ture as an Indonesian national leader. The expulsion was there­
fore a direct attack on his political line (Sjahrir was still 
rather unknown at the time).
I took the first train for Leiden in search of my friends.
In a large room at the residence of a wealthy Indonesian, Hatta 
was sitting on a chair, his hands on his knees, staring out in 
front of him. Behind stood a couple of Indonesian students, 
nervously chatting. Hatta told me the tale of the cell forma­
tion— which I knew about already--and the final intrigue. It 
was clear that he was deeply concerned over the damage which 
might be done his reputation. For in Indonesia no one, naturally, 
knew precisely what the Perhimpunan Indonesia had become, still 
less what Communist cell construction was. His story was inter­
rupted by a burst of laughter. It was Sjahrir, who sat on the 
piano, his legs dangling. His laugh had a sarcastic tone. Now 
Sjahrir was younger than Hatta and that counts in a student 
milieu and doubly in an Indonesian one. But he could not con­
ceal his annoyance at all that despair. "What difference does 
it make?" he broke out. "Last week Hatta and I resigned from 
the PI; we didn’t want to have anything more to do with a Commu­
nist organization. You can’t kick someone out who’s already 
left." And he added, "We are not going to protest the decision 
of the PI executive. We’ll let it be known we’ll have nothing 
to do with the PI." His outburst stopped Hatta’s keening.
to PI meetings if Communist deputies were also to be allowed 
to speak there. Left SDAP members attempted to maintain in­
formal contact with non-Communist PI members, but this soon 
became impossible owing to pressure by the dominant factions 
in the SDAP and PI leaderships.
9. Hatta was expelled from the Perhimpunan Indonesia on November 
27, 1931. In May he had announced that he would no longer be 
politically active; however, he subsequently led the attack 
on the decision to dissolve the PNI (see note 11 below), and 
the Perhimpunan Indonesia leaders charged him with trying to 
split the revolutionary movement. At the time of the expul­
sion, Sjahrir was secretary and vice chairman of the Perhim­
punan Indonesia. (Tr.)
That scene has always stayed with me. Sjahrir was the only 
one of that company who had not flown into a panic. He was not 
intimidated for one minute by official or quasi-official declara­
tions, by communiques or other formulae, not afraid for one 
second of 'the maneuvers directed against him, and still less 
concerned for his reputation. That mixture of self-confidence 
and realism, that courage based on the absence of any ambition 
or vanity, marked the man. The occasion may seem small (though 
it was not for those young students, whose futures were involved 
in the affair), but that is not important: whoever has once
stood his ground in a crisis will do so in the future. And the 
other way round. What a person can learn from his life experi­
ence is limited: you can’t learn to grow beyond your natural
limits, and in a crisis those limits appear.
Sjahrir and Hatta, who had been united in the struggle 
against the Communists, thereafter went their way together.
They made a curious pair, very unlike in character, and they 
could not avoid irritating each other from time to time. Sjahrir 
would be annoyed by Hatta’s bourgeois conventionality, but Hatta 
was a much more conscientious and systematic worker, and 
Sjahrirfs swift dippings into science must have bothered him in 
turn. They had a few basic qualities in common, however. Both 
were serious. Sjahrir had nobility of character, and Hatta 
possessed a deeply-rooted common sense; those two qualities 
have more in common than might be thought at first. They there­
fore came to each other again and again, in spite of their sepa­
ration by the war— the period which Hatta spent at the side of 
Sukarno--and in spite of the Islam and the narrower nationalism 
of Hatta.
Their first difference with Sukarno dated from 1931 as well. 
The most accomplished agitator in the Netherlands Indies had al­
ready been arrested and released from prison.10 He continued 
unswervingly in his activity, although the reaction of the 
Indies government became increasingly harsh. For the ultra­
leftist admirers of Sukarno, that was a reason to cheer him on 
all the more. But Hatta and Sjahrir were not at all impressed, 
and whenever they discussed the events in Indonesia, their com­
ments grew more and more irritated. I myself, as spokesman of 
the left wing of the student union, was deeply absorbed in radi­
cal argumentations, and it was an enlightening experience for 
me to see how those two young men discerned the danger of dema­
gogy and took a position against it in defiance of the atmos­
phere prevailing about them. They maintained that Sukarno’s 
irresponsible agitation took no account whatsoever of real
10. Sukarno led the Partai Nasional Indonesia, or "Old PNI,M 
which had been founded in June 1927. At the end of 1929, 
he was arrested, together with other party leaders, on 
charges of revolutionary activity. He was released from 
prison at the end of 1931. (Tr.)
power relations. He created expectations in his audience which 
he could by no means fulfill and he gave the Netherlands Indies 
authorities an opportunity to intervene against the nationalists, 
which they did with an increasingly hard hand. Nothing positive, 
nothing permanent could be achieved in this way and the number 
of victims became ever greater. When Sukarno was arrested, his 
fate had everyone’s attention; but what was done to his followers 
was much worse, and the press scarcely had a thought for them.
In this manner, the cadre of the nationalist movement— which 
needed all it had— was destroyed. The loss was not immediately 
noticeable, since Sukarno was always able to shout up great 
crowds with his hypnotic oratory, but the movement which he led 
became more and more a heap of loose sand.
This disturbed Sjahrir and Hatta all the more because they 
were convinced that cadre forming had become the great problem 
of the nationalist movement (a conviction which was to be con­
firmed tragically after the revolution) . "If Sukarno goes on 
this way,” Sjahrir once said to me, "there soon won’t be any 
possibility left for cadre formation. Everyone will then be in 
a mess." "Besides," Hatta added, "with his activity he is 
creating a climate of oppression in which no one will be able 
to carry on any work." So they wrote letters to the Indies in 
which they pressed for moderation and urged Sukarno and his 
allies to give more thought--and certainly to provide more op- 
portunity--for cadre forming, for political and organizational 
education. But that was naturally all in vain, for Sukarno had 
no personal interest whatever in such advice--what he needed 
was excitement and applause.
To the public, Sukarno was the most active nationalist 
figure and also the most well-known. To break with him was thus 
no small decision; but cooperation seemed impossible to the two 
students, and they decided to go their own way. That way was 
education, cadre forming. If it was necessary to establish a 
new party for this purpose, they would do that, but it was only 
in order to create a vehicle for cadre formation.11 Hatta and
11. Following the arrest of Sukarno, Sartono took over the chair­
manship of the PNI. He and his colleagues decided that al­
though the party was still not officially proscribed, its 
opportunity for activity had become so restricted that it 
would be wiser to reconstitute it in a less provocative if 
still nationalist form. They therefore dissolved the PNI 
in April 1931 and formed the Partai Indonesia (Partindo). 
Hatta attacked this move sharply In articles sent to the 
press in Indonesia, arguing both that the PNI should not 
have been given up so readily and that the new party was 
based on wrong principles. Those PNI members in Indonesia 
who did not feel at home in the Partindo initially formed 
"free groups" (Golongan Merdeka), which were brought together 
in the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia ("New PNI"), formed in
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Sjahrir were convinced that it would be years before independence 
could be realized, and they knew that the national movement was 
not prepared for it intellectually, technically, or organiza­
tionally. They thus wanted to use the long period which they 
saw lying .before them for the formation of a political elite.
Once Sjahrir brought up the suggestion that I should accompany 
them to the Indies, in order to take part in the formation of a 
cadre school. Hatta would teach economics there; Sjahrir and I 
would somehow divide sociology, politics and organization between 
us. .Nothing much came of the proposal, if only because it was 
clear that the Indies government would never let me into the 
colony.
And so Hatta and Sjahrir went back to the Indies; Sjahrir 
first, Hatta after him.* 12 Sjahrir1s decision to go back was 
made rather unexpectedly and in haste. He never was an exact 
organizer, and so there vanished, together with the books he 
sent home, a small part of my library, including unfortunately 
a work that I had borrowed from the University, Rosa Luxemburg’s 
Akkumulation des Kapitals. The whole collection was confiscated 
by the Indies government on arrival and never reappeared. This 
meant that I, pursued by the administration of the University 
library, had to embark on an exhausting chase through the second­
hand book market in order to acquire a copy of the unfindable 
work. It was my atonement for the sins of my government.
Both Sjahrir and Hatta were worried about returning, and 
as far as Sjahrir was concerned, he had few illusions about the 
fate that awaited him there. His departure from us had nothing 
of the joyful return to the homeland, but more of a mission to 
a danger zone. And that indeed it turned out to be. However 
carefully Hatta and Sjahrir acted, no constructive work was pos­
sible in the atmosphere of oppression which they found in the 
Indies, which was worsened by Sukarno’s powerless but fanatical 
bellowing. The party which Hatta and Sjahrir set up was banned, 
like Sukarno’s, but whereas Sukarno was sent to a normal prison, 
Hatta and Sjahrir landed in Digul, the concentration camp in
December 1931 in Jogjakarta. As its name indicates, the new 
association stressed study, and it aimed at creating a 
trained political cadre rather than acquiring mass member­
ship. Sukarno, on his release from prison at the end of 
1931, attempted to mediate between the Partindo and New PNI 
in order to reunite the revolutionary movement, but opposi­
tion was too great on both sides, and in August 1932 he ac­
knowledged his failure and chose for the Partindo. (Tr.)
12. Sjahrir returned to Indonesia in February 1932 and assumed 
leadership of the New PNI. Hatta arrived in August 1932 and 
immediately announced his decision to join that party. He 
thereupon replaced Sjahrir as its chairman. (Tr.)
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New Guinea, where their health quickly declined as the govern­
ment intended.13 14
After some time, however, especially when it became known 
that Sjahrir was threatened with tuberculosis, the two— thanks 
to our agitation in Holland, we liked to think— were removed 
from Digul, and Sjahrir was sent to Banda.11* I again began to 
receive letters from him, but after a time the correspondence 
faded out. There were personal reasons for this, but others as 
well^ as I shall now describe.
In 1935 I had established a journal, Be Nieuwe Kern (The 
New Elite) together with my friend Jacques de Kadt (or rather 
he with me, for he had an established name and I had none), in 
which we sought a revision of socialist ideas.15 16 In 1933 De 
Kadt and I had, together with the rest of the left wing, left 
the SDAP and established the Independent Socialist Party (OSP). 
of which De Kadt became the first and I the second secretary.1* 
But in two years, we had both abandoned the new party, for it 
had become apparent to us that a small, extremist splinter party 
had no justification whatsoever in Netherlands politics and 
could only lead to adventures disguised by Marxist verbiage.
We decided not only to break with the party but to go further 
and subject Marxism, which had turned out to be so misleading a 
guide, to a critical investigation. In De Nieuwe Kern the cur­
rent ideas about Marxism were therefore attacked. For polemics
13. Sukarno was arrested in August 1933; he was interned first
in Flores and later at Bengkulen. Sjahrir and Hatta were ar­
rested in 1934. (Tr.)
14. Sjahrir was transferred to Banda in 1936; he was released in 
1942 as a result of the Japanese invasion. (Tr.)
15. De Kadt developed into a leading essayist; he published among 
other things Van Tsarisme tot Stalinisme (From Tsarism to 
Stalinism), Het Fascisme en de Nieuwe Vrijheid (Fascism and 
the New Freedom), and many collections of articles on politi- 
cal, literary, and philosophical subjects. During the war
he was in Indonesia; after his return to the Netherlands he 
published De Indonesische Tragedie (The Indonesian Tragedy). 
(Author’s note.)
16. The Onafhankelijk Socialistische Partij was formed following 
a split in the SDAP caused by the resignation of left-wing 
leaders at the party congress of 1932. The rumor that Hatta 
intended to stand for the Dutch parliament as a candidate of 
the OSP was the cause of a major controversy in the Indone­
sian nationalist movement in 1933-34. The party did not do 
well electorally and soon dissolved, its more radical members 
joining the syndicalist Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP). 
(Tr.)
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are the weapon of scientific progress, and I cannot see how one 
can criticize so aggressive a doctrine as Marxism without one­
self taking up strong positions.
But Sjahrir, isolated in Banda, had remained with the ideas 
of his student years. In his ears there still rang the polemics 
that we as young Marxists had carried on with the reformists, 
who had attempted in their own way to confuse the anti-colonial 
struggle. For him, to leave Marxism meant to leave the radical 
struggle, or at least that was more or less the spirit in which 
he wrote me. It was another betrayal of his beloved. I answered 
him that you can very well be anti-bourgeois and anti-Socialist 
(nowadays I could write nonconformist), without necessarily 
clinging to Marxist dogma; and that on the contrary a noncon­
formism which did not rely on agitation, as did Marxist propa­
ganda, was more solid and thus more effective. But I received 
only an irritable reply to this. I was evidently not capable 
of countering the influence on him of others who clung firmly 
to the conventional radical theories.
It became worse when we published an article by Sjahrir 
(under a pseudonym) in our journal, in which he defended the 
dialectic. I don’t remember how we got hold of the piece. We 
placed it because we needed a polemic on the dialectic, and it 
was followed up by two articles by de Kadt under the expressive 
title ’’The Mouldering Whatnot” (De vermolmde etagere) , which 
did not leave much of SjahrirTs argument standing. Sjahrir was 
furious. He had not been very happy with his creation, and he 
was shocked when he saw it printed, especially when he learned 
of the heavy fire which de Kadt had directed against it. He 
turned his anger over the matter against me. I had not thought 
for a moment that he had not intended the article for publica­
tion, but his unhappiness was understandable.
Sjahrir was not a man of science; he had neither systematic 
nor original elements in his generalizing ability, which are 
what characterizes the scientific man. He was dependent on 
others for his scientific ideas and thought processes, though he 
had great interest in and respect for science, and he gave it 
an important place in his own intellectual life. But one cannot 
ask more of a politician; this is already much more than the 
average one can manage. The special thing about Sjahrir was his 
realism and his courage, and the fact that he tried his best to 
unite these elements with his cultural background. He had 
leadership qualities and he was a good teacher, but he was not 
at home in a theoretical journal. That is, of course, no intel­
lectual value judgment. The significance of SjahrirTs work lay 
in the first place in his political decisions and secondly in 
his political articles. In this he was a clarifier, an educator, 
and a mature intellectual of much more than average significance. 
But it was years before he realized that we had not been com­
pletely in the wrong in 1936.
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From the few letters which I received I got the impression 
that he was not unhappy in Banda. He could devote himself there 
to two passions in which he had only begun to indulge in the 
last years of our acquaintance-playing with children and teach­
ing. "I*really find teaching the greatest work there is," he 
once remarked to me, and his comment impressed me, for helping 
young people to shape themselves is one of the noblest tasks of 
society. What struck me still more, however, was the way in 
which Sjahrir could play with children. It could not be called 
relaxation; it was a passion, an act of release. It was as if 
he, playing with children, vanished into a world without ten­
sions, quarrels, and problems.
This revealed to me a new side of Sjahrir, and the few re­
ports that I got from Banda lent strength to that impression.
At the bottom of his heart, Sjahrir did not love politics. He 
engaged in it from a feeling of duty but not from interest. He 
was not fascinated by that remarkable, turbulent, passionate 
phenomenon— sometimes noble, often dirty, but utterly human-- 
which we call politics. He had no feeling of vocation. In his 
youth that was not noticeable; politics and science were dis­
covered by him simultaneously and for a long time went together, 
and everything was done with the same boyish vitality which was 
its own reward. But later, when the stakes, the seriousness, 
and thus the worries began to increase, when his vitality had 
been sapped by introspection, his internal resistance increased 
and with it his nostalgia for a child’s world. It is dangerous 
to engage in politics solely from a feeling of duty: no trade
can be carried on well without enthusiasm, and the "trade" of 
politics did not have Sjahrir’s.
During the war, de Kadt was in Indonesia and was put into 
a concentration camp by the Japanese. Shortly after the Japanese 
surrender, Sjahrir looked him up in the camp, after which a re­
lationship was established between the two which had no mean 
influence on Sjahrir. When they first met, everything in the 
country had become unstuck, but Sjahrir had acquired such a dis­
like of the Indonesian nationalists who had worked with the 
Japanese that he had no desire to cooperate with them.17 As de 
Kadt pointed out, it was those nationalists who held the leader­
ship of the revolution, and Sjahrirfs refusal would mean that 
he would have no part in it. Whether Sjahrirfs revulsion was a 
momentary mood is something I cannot judge, but it was not the 
reaction of a born politician.
In the fall of 1945, fate suddenly placed me in contact 
with Indonesia again. I had become foreign affairs writer for
17. During World War II, Sjahrir refused to cooperate with the 
Japanese occupation forces and spent the time in retirement, 
cultivating a group of young followers in Djakarta who were 
to become active in the Indonesian revolution. (Tr.)
149
a daily that, like all Dutch newspapers, had been reconstituted 
after liberation. The five years of German occupation had 
caused a sharp break in Dutch society: a generation of politi­
cians, writers and journalists was pushed aside and a new one 
took its place. The new generation had little experience, and 
most of its writers had paid no attention to politics before 
the war. In that first period after liberation, when everyone 
was trying with feverish haste to provide himself with a politi­
cal character, we were almost completely isolated from news 
about Asia and especially about Indonesia. The Dutch officials 
based in Australia who were making a desperate and useless 
attempt to impose the past on Indonesia, saw not the slightest 
need to keep the Dutch people informed. 8 The Indies were a 
vacuum that we filled with concern. And that almost complete 
ignorance caused by the circumstances of the time explains how 
it was possible that the Dutch people embarked with almost no 
protest on a trail that was to lead them into tragic conflict 
with the young Indonesian revolution.
The number of people in the communications media at that 
time who had ever heard of Sukarno could be counted on one hand; 
the name Sjahrir said nothing to anybody. In that situation I 
was called one day by my chief editor. A telegram had come-- 
Reuters or AP— which reported a conversation between Lt. Gen.
Sir Philip Christison, Allied Commander-in-Chief for the Nether­
lands Indies, and Sukarno.18 9 The report, which had already been 
tossed into the wastebasket by the editors .but which had been 
fished out again by a man with a sense of news, struck me like 
a thunderbolt. It was the first real news of what was going on 
in the Indies. If a man of Christison*s position found it 
worthwhile to talk with Sukarno, the man who had been thrown 
into prison by the Dutch, then we could reckon that the Dutch 
were through in Indonesia. The war of independence was under 
way. And when I was asked who would lead that revolution, I 
said Sjahrir, a name that meant nothing to the others there.
My prediction had nothing magical about it. I was certain 
that the leadership of the revolution had to come from the group 
of Indonesians whom I had known as a student. I had seen them 
at work. I knew that there was one who could not be panicked 
by any crisis and very few people have that gift. When the
18. The Netherlands Indies government had been evacuated to
Australia following the Japanese invasion of 1942; it con­
tinued to function there in exile until the return of Dutch 
forces in late 1945. (Tr.)
19. This would seem to be the meeting of October 7, 1945, when 
Sukarno presented General Christison with a memorandum on 
the Indonesian situation. Christison was from the British 
army, the initial occupation of Indonesia having been allotted 
to British forces. (Tr.)
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revolution in Indonesia broke out, the same qualities were de­
manded of the mature Sjahrir that he had shown himself to pos­
sess fifteen years before. He was not intimidated by the action 
of the established governments with which he suddenly had to 
deal; he* did not let himself be captured by the formalistic 
bickering of the Dutch politicians; he didnTt panic even when 
his life was in danger. He had nothing to lose because he sought 
to win nothing for himself.20
The reports of the revolution which we received in Holland 
from foreign and Dutch journalists were so fragmentary and one­
sided, and indeed so often stupid and sensationalist, that it 
was difficult to form a reasonable idea of what was going on.
We got our best information from friends returning from Indone­
sia. In this way I got a picture of the struggle which Sjahrir 
was carrying on, and of his courageous and clear insight into 
the confused circumstances there. As was to be expected, he 
towered above his surroundings. What made Sjahrir into a leader 
was not only his insight, his unselfishness and his courage.
It was also the strength of his personality--and such strength 
requires a certain degree of intolerance or insensitivity. Good 
qualities (as well as bad) are only effective in politics when 
they are displayed with force, when their effect is imposed on 
others. Sjahrir had the willpower to impose himself, so long as 
he was interested; and in that tumultuous historical moment 
which is called the Indonesian revolution, he was interested.
Perhaps the high point of his career was the publication 
of his pamphlet Our Struggle.21 Whoever reads that pamphlet 
today can scarcely comprehend what it demanded in insight and 
courage. For it appeared at a moment when the Indonesian 
masses, brought to the boiling point by the Japanese occupation 
and civil war, sought release in racist and other hysterical 
outbursts. Sjahrir*s pamphlet went directly against this, and 
many must have felt his call for chivalry, for the understanding 
of other ethnic groups, as a personal attack. Sjahrir*s activ­
ity saved Indonesia from chaos at that moment, for what Sukarno 
brought about with his Guided Democracy was only a pale shadow 
of what threatened Indonesia in 1945. At that moment Sjahrir 
was great, but I could only appreciate this from a distance.
I was not to see him again until 1948, when he arrived in 
London to seek international support for the war with the Nether­
lands . He asked me to come over, together with a few other Dutch
20. Sjahrir became prime minister of the Indonesian republic in
November 1945; he headed three cabinets, the last of which 
fell in June 1947. (Tr.)
21. The pamphlet, Perdjuangan Kita, was published in November 
1945. For a version m  English, see Sutan Sjahrir, Our 
Struggle (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968). 
(Tr.)
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acquaintances. Almost twenty years separated us from our youth­
ful memories, which were buried under exile, war, and civil 
strife. We shared the painful consciousness of having grown 
older, together with the question: what had remained of our
old friendship?
He came into the room at Claridge’s with a bound. The ten­
sion which had been growing in me was released with the stupid 
remark: ”YouTve gotten fat!” He grimaced, but after some hesita­
tion "and a few awkward gestures, contact was established again.
I found him greatly changed. Because he had become stouter 
(later he told me that this had begun in Banda, when he had to 
struggle against tuberculosis),his face had become fuller; it 
had lost the concentrated beauty which had once made me think of 
a classical carving. His features had become rougher. He 
spoke faster, more decisively, and with the certainty of someone 
who is accustomed to take decisions and bear heavy responsibili­
ties. All this had existed embryonically in his appearance as 
a young man, but now it had developed enormously. A new tone 
had also been added, the tone of someone who does not expect to 
be contradicted. For the first time I found in his manner a 
quality which he had never shown as a young man: impatience.
He was undoubtedly overworked— or rather overburdened— at that 
time, weighed down by responsibilities, tensions, and justified 
fears. But that does not completely explain the hardness with 
which he now dealt with his surroundings.
It was the first time that I met Subandrio, who functioned 
as Sjahrir!s personal secretary.22 He was treated as an office 
boy in my presence. That was for me in complete contradiction 
to the picture that I had had of Sjahrir, and it shocked me more 
than anything else. Undoubtedly Subandrio was a miserable 
careerist, a Judas who would always betray his master for the 
sake of promotion. But I have to ask myself whether the venge­
fulness that Subandrio showed later toward Sjahrir did not have 
its origin in the humiliations that he meekly underwent in 
London. If so, Sjahrir's behavior was dearly paid for. For 
prison under Sukarno's Guided Democracy accomplished what the 
Dutch colonial jails did not--it killed him.23
22. Subandrio, who had been a member of SjahrirTs wartime group, 
was in charge of the Indonesian representation in London 
during the revolution. The office attempted to gain inter­
national recognition for the Republic, and when sovereignty 
was transferred from the Netherlands to Indonesia it was 
granted embassy status. (Tr.)
23. Sjahrir was imprisoned in 1962 on political charges. After 
suffering a stroke, he was allowed to go to Switzerland for 
treatment in 1965; he died there in 1966 at 57 years of age. 
(Tr.)
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I saw him a few times in Indonesia after the revolution.
The first time was in 1955, when the elections were held which 
had been announced with so much hope and which were instead to 
mark the beginning of developments so fateful for Indonesia.
He had changed again. He had lost much of his impatience, and 
the hardness had been replaced by a calmer decisiveness. But 
in losing his tenseness, he had lost a good part of his dynamism. 
In his appearance, his speech, his argument, he had come to a 
reflectiveness that sometimes bordered on a lack of interest.
He still interrupted his conversation repeatedly with a laugh.
It was a laugh of deprecation--but no longer of self-deprecation.
Sjahrir!s great time had passed and with it his role. He 
had played a decisive part in the first years of the revolution, 
the turning years, when he was the only one who did not panic 
but who saw clearly and went his way unafraid. He could survive 
in the maelstrom because his strong personality had a greater 
hold on the situation than did an army division, and because he 
could establish temporary hegemony with the help of an elite.
He had that elite; it was the core of the PSI and those--for 
example the army officers--who sympathized with that party, or 
rather were influenced by it.21* But he was lost as soon as 
Indonesian political life began to be organized.
Sjahrir could never completely free himself from the tradi­
tional concepts of socialism; he never could judge the historical 
basis of Western socialism with an uninhibitedly critical eye.
Had he done so he would have come to the conclusion that none 
of the requirements which enabled the rise and spread of Western 
socialism were present in Asia, and certainly not in Indonesia. 
Socialism cannot live as an isolated undercurrent in that world;
24. The PSI— Partai Sosialis Indonesia--was formed in February 
1948 as a result of a split in the Partai Sosialis between 
a minority wing led by Sjahrir and a majority wing led by 
Amir Sjarifuddin. The Partai Sosialis had itself been formed 
by the amalgamation in December 1945 of Sjahrir1s PeopleTs 
Socialist Party (Partai Rakjat Sosialis), which he had 
founded a month before, and SjarifuddinT s Partai Sosialis 
Indonesia. During 1948, Sjarifuddin?s Socialist Party moved 
towards merger with the Communists and advocacy of all-out 
national liberation war against the Dutch, while Sjahrir1s 
PSI turned increasingly to accommodation with the United 
States as a necessary and acceptable source of outside sup­
port against the Dutch. The PSI was influential in the 
first postrevolutionary Indonesian cabinets and had close 
ties to the army leaders who were in office until the at­
tempted coup of October 17, 1952. The party did poorly in 
the elections of 1955, except in Bali, where it had acquired 
the support of powerful traditional leaders. It was banned 
in August 1960 as a result of refusing to accept the condi­
tions of Guided Democracy. (Tr.)
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it can only be fruitful as a stimulating idea working on mass 
organizations. A socialist party can only become a splinter 
group in a country like Indonesia, and Sjahrir should have gone 
with his friends into one of the major parties in order to work 
as a ginger group for socialist ideals. But which party? The 
PNI? Too much of Sukarno clung to it, and Sjahrir was not 
enough of a professional politician (in the Leninist sense, that 
is someone for whom politics comes before everything else) to 
overcome his repugnance at that. The struggle for a place in 
the PNI sun would have been fierce, though it is not impossible 
that in the long run he might have formed a wing which could 
have made his position secure. The Masjumi? Sjahrir was too 
secular, and in that early period the Masjumi was still firmly 
clamped to the sectarian doctrine of the Islamic state. Only 
later would the leadership and cadre of that party acquire a 
character that would bring it very close to Sjahrir and his 
group (for why really call the PSI a party?). It was only 
natural that this closeness would lead to cooperation; and that 
cooperation would have had a greater historical influence if 
Sjahrir had been able to proceed from a more powerful party 
position.
Did this problem sometimes disturb him? In our first meet­
ing in Djakarta after the war, in 1955, he told me that a leader 
of the Nahdatul Ulama had come to him to ask if he would not 
place a few intellectuals from his group at the disposal of the 
NU, which had practically no cadre. It was a possibility for 
acquiring influence over this still amorphous grouping and to 
lead the opposition to the demagogic and corrupting tendencies 
which were making themselves evident in it. "But I couldn’t 
help him; my people find it much too boring to deal with people 
of that level," Sjahrir added cheerfully.
I remember, too, that Sjahrir, just returned from a propa­
ganda tour through Bali, told me with great satisfaction about 
the warm reception he had had everywhere and of the patience 
with which the large audiences listened to his quiet noninflam­
matory speeches. "All my speeches were lessons," he said, not 
without pride, and he prophesied a good number of votes for the 
PSI. Alas, a few days later the general elections brought a 
rude awakening. Indonesia was not Bali; but Sjahrir, withdrawn 
into his own circle, had not been conscious of that.
Sjahrir did have characteristics that could have made him 
a charismatic leader. I believe that the reason he did not 
really become one and did not succeed in maintaining his popu­
larity does not lie in the fact that he was a mediocre speaker. 
Was Gandhi an orator? Nehru? Nyerere? But, as I once wrote 
Sjahrir, somewhat awkwardly, you can’t become a leader of your 
people if you don’t share any of their prejudices. Somewhere 
there must be an element of contact, warm and complex as the 
human body. Whoever rejects this out of a rationalistic hygiene 
is in danger of declining into isolation. With Sjahrir’s
followers, who possessed neither his originality of character 
nor his modesty, this attitude became exaggerated into a carica­
ture of arrogance, typical for an elite grown sterile. As for 
Sjahrir himself, Schiller has written that a person who has given 
sufficiently of the best of his time has lived for all time.
For a brief period— a few years— Sjahrir led his people with the 
insight, the courage, and the nobility of a great man. That is 
a contribution so rare that it cannot be judged.
